Planning to work in retirement?

Two-thirds of workers plan to work in retirement, mostly because they know they haven't saved enough to support their current standard of living. In reality, less than one-quarter of those in retirement work for pay (WSJ, no subscription required). 

There is a big disconnect between those who think they can work in retirement and those who actually succeed in doing so.

Why? The three big reasons are health crises, layoffs and ageism. If you are unhealthy, you can't work. If you get fired and can't get a new job, then there's no paycheck. If you are too old to do the job or employers simply won't hire someone your age, then employment won't fill your spending gap.

Working in retirement seems like a great idea. It keeps you mentally and physically active. The evidence shows that those who keep working show less cognitive decline. Most who work in retirement do it because they enjoy it, not because they need it to cover their spending.

The bad news is that retirees find it hard to find employment or remain employed.

The good news is that most retirees learn to get by on a lower standard of living. Studies show that such retirees are happier and less stressed than they expected to be.

If you'd prefer to avoid the "getting by" solution, then the best thing to do is save more for retirement rather than planning to work.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Latest client letter

Athena Capital's 1st quarter 2015 client letter is available.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Income inequality...tax inequality

Income inequality has become a big political topic recently. Unfortunately, the debate is filled with more emotions than facts.

What shouldn't be surprising is that those who make more also pay more in taxes--a lot more (especially with our progressive tax system).

Anyone who wants to understand the income inequality debate should probably become acquainted with some of the facts about how much tax inequality comes with income inequality.

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal (subscription required), with data from the Tax Policy Center, highlights this issue.

The bottom 20% in the U.S. makes $0 to $24,200 a year, earns 4.5% of total U.S. income, and gets paid 2.2% from income tax.  

The next 20% makes $24,200 to $47,300, earning 9.3% of U.S. income, and gets paid 1% from income tax.

The middle 20% makes $47,300 to $79,500 a year, earns 14.8% of total U.S. income and pays 5.9% of total income tax.

The next 20% makes $79,500 to $134,300, earning 20% of total U.S. income and paying 13.4% of total income tax.

The top 20% makes more than $134,300 a year, earns 51.3% of total U.S. income and pays 83.9% of the total income tax.

Breaking down the top 20%, the first 10% (those making the top 80% to 90% of income) makes $134,300 to $180,500, earns 13.1% of U.S. income and pays 10.8% of the income tax.

The next 5% (top 90% to 95%) makes $180,500 to $261,500 a year, earning 9% of all income, and pays 9.1% of the income tax.

The next 4% (top 95% to 99%) makes $261,500 to $615,000, earns 12.1% of all U.S. income, and pays 18.3% of income tax.

The top 1% makes over $615,000, earning 17.1% of all income and paying 45.7% of all income tax.

Yes, income in the U.S. is unequal, and that is because native ability, work ethic, and knowledge are unequal. 

It should be acknowledged, too, that those who make so much also pay MUCH more than those who earn less.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

How should you pull your money in retirement?

How you withdraw your money in retirement can have a big impact on how long your money lasts (or how much you can withdraw each year).

The conventional wisdom espoused by Vanguard, Fidelity, etc. is to pull the money from your taxable account first, then from tax deferred accounts (Roth IRA, traditional IRA).

Unfortunately, things aren't that simple. By withdrawing your money in a more tax-efficient manner, the money can last 4, 5, even 6 years longer (or last the same amount of time with higher withdrawals).

This issue has been highlighted by many, but in particular in a recent article in the Financial Analysts Journal (subscription required).

Instead of pulling all your money from your taxable account first and then moving on to tax-deferred accounts after the taxable account is depleted, the money will last longer if you withdraw money from a traditional IRA up to the 15% tax bracket limit, then pull the rest from you taxable account each year. 

Even more time can be gained by transferring dollars from your tax deferred account (traditional IRA) to your Roth IRA each year to generate not too much taxes while also maximizing  tax exempt benefits of the Roth IRA.

More time still can be gained by transferring dollars from your tax deferred account to two Roth accounts and then recharacterizing the one that has lower gains (or greater loses) each year back to the tax deferred account.

These strategies are too complex to explain here in detail (I'd be happy to send the article to anyone who requests it, but I must warn you it is a technical and dry academic paper). Also, some of these strategies may seem too complex or troublesome to implement, but that does not diminish their benefits.

It is vitally important to save enough for retirement, but it is also important to consider how you will withdraw your money in retirement to make sure the money serves you best.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Frugality for Fortune

When most think of building a fortune, they think of starting a business, taking a big gamble, or getting wildly lucky.

The reality is that building a fortune is easily accessible to anyone willing to live within their means, save diligently, and invest wisely.

The Millionaire Next Door illustrates this point well. So did a recent article in the Wall Street Journal (subscription required).

Ronald Read recently passes away at the age of 92 with $8 million in investments and saving. Did he start a business, take a big gamble or get wildly lucky? Nope.

He "displayed remarkable frugality and patience--which gave him many years of compounded growth." "He lived modestly, working as a maintenance worker and janitor at a J.C. Penney store after a long stint at a service station...."

"Those who knew him talk of how he at times used safety pins to hold his coat together and sometimes parked his 2007 Toyota Yaris far from where he was going to avoid having to feed the parking meter."

This isn't quite the 1% popularly portrayed in the media. This was a normal guy who worked, saved and invested.

"Mr. Read owned at least 95 stocks at the time of his death, many of which he had held for years, if not decades." Not really day trading.

His holdings were "spread across a variety of sectors, including railroads, utility companies, banks, health care, telecom and consumer products. He avoided technology stocks." He invested in things he understood after doing his own research.

"Friends say he typically bought shares of companies he was familiar with and those that paid hefty dividends. When dividend checks came in the mail, he plowed the money back into more shares...."

No six-figure income. No internet start-up. Just living within his means, saving consistently, investing after doing his homework. Being patient, being frugal, thinking long term.

Financial success doesn't require lots of luck or risk taking. Just simple strategies implemented consistently. 

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Net neutrality and Title II regulation of broadband

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) voted 3-2 to regulate broadband internet yesterday (under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934). This move is being heralded as a big victory for the little guy. In reality, it is the victory of those with more political influence over those with less. In contrast to the way it is being portrayed, I see this as a loss for the little guy.

(Full disclosure: I and my clients own shares in companies that provide broadband internet).

Title II regulation gives the government sweeping powers to regulate broadband internet, which is the way people access the internet through their cable, copper or wireless connection. This is being portrayed as a benefit to consumers: so that there is no interference between the providers of online content and the users who want to see that content (a concept frequently referred to as net neutrality).

The fear has been that cable, DSL and cellphone companies would throttle and restrict access to the web in order to extract "a pound of flesh" from users and content providers. In this view, access to the internet is a public good granted by the government through franchise rights and wireless spectrum. As such, the government must intervene to protect users and content providers from mean-spirited content distributors. 

Content distributors have a right to their work and investment just as much as content producers and users. Buying cable franchises (that aren't exclusive) and spectrum doesn't bring broadband to our doors.  It takes massive investment in cables, people, equipment, digging, stringing poles, writing software, etc.). The stock and bond holders of those companies (which are mostly little guys) deserve a return on their investment just like everyone else. They should be able to determine how their assets are utilized as long as they aren't violating anyone else's rights. So far, they haven't.

It is not content users that are crying foul and asking for government interference (except, perhaps, those selling pirated movies that don't want to have to pay for their massive bandwidth usage). Instead it is content providers who don't want to have to pay to access broadband distribution. It is Netflix and other broadband hogs which sometimes occupy 60% of broadband at a time that are crying foul and want government intervention, not users on the whole. 

This is a fight between big guys and big guys, not little guys, and the ones who can get the government on their side wins (the profits margins of content providers asking for Title II regulation are much higher than the content distributors, perhaps this is why they can gain more influence).

And, here, we can go back to a historical analog. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was created 101 years ago, partly to regulate railroads who were being accused of charging unfair rates. The complaints came mostly from businesses that didn't want to have to pay so much for railroad service, not from consumers (sound familiar). 

The result was a labyrinthine regulatory structure that strangled the railroad industry in the United States for over 60 years. When railroads found it almost impossible to charge rates to justify investment in their railroad systems, the systems went into chronic disrepair. The railroad industry limped along for years under-investing in their tracks, engines and freight cars, thus killing passenger travel (which survives today only with government subsidies and regulation that forces railroad freight companies to let passenger trains use their track). Only recently, since the Staggers Act of 1980, has the railroad industry recovered, and one of the biggest reasons is that they can charge fees that justify investment.

Turning back to broadband, I believe the same thing will happen. At first, the regulation will be used as a light touch to nudge broadband providers to be "more fair" to users who complain loudest, or at least who have the most political influence. Over time, though, it will throttle investment in the industry, hurting the very content providers and users it is supposed to help (every phone and cable company I follow has said they will reduce their investment in broadband distribution if they can't generate sufficient return).

To raise capital and build an industry, businesses need to be able to make money. As long as no one's rights are being violated, the market best decides where assets should go and at what prices. In the absence of that productive situation, investment and progress will stagnate. In the long run, the little guy will be hurt most (but he won't realize this, because he'll never know what he could have had).

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

The big benefits of boosting your savings--even by small amounts!

Everyone knows they need to save more for retirement. But most don't because they think they can't afford it.

The reality is that even small boosts in savings can have large impacts over the fullness of time.

A Wall Street Journal article and a report by Fidelity Investments makes this point clear: even boosting your savings by 1% will have a meaningful impact on your retirement income.

It's more fun to focus on getting higher returns, but the most potent force in anyone's retirement plan is their own willingness to save.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Stock market up 60% since 2007 peak

Building wealth over time requires the fortitude to stick to your plan.

Colorado Spring's own Allan Roth made this point nicely in a recent Wall Street Journal article. His basic point is that even if you had been unlucky enough to buy at the stock market peak of 2007, your wealth would still be 60% higher now if you had stuck with it.

The problem is that so few stick with it.

Yes, the market went down over 50% from that 2007 peak. But, those losses were temporary. The U.S. businesses underlying the market rebounded and are doing well.

Nothing in life is free. The price of generating good long term investment returns is having the courage to stick to a good plan. 

That means you have to be able to ride the market up and down without getting so that scared you sell at the bottom or so euphoric that you don't adjust your portfolio at the top.

Becoming wealthy is not rocket science. Spend 80% of you income, invest the other 20% in the highest performing asset class over time--stocks--and have the intestinal fortitude to stick to that plan over time.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Adapting as an investor

I remember well how much I loved to program computers. As a cadet at the Air Force Academy taking lots of astronautical engineering courses, I had to do a lot of computer programming.  These projects were very complex, requiring precise calculations (to 8 significant digits) of the velocity and position of satellites, antenna pointing angles, terrestrial positions, etc. They were done on 286 Zenith computers without hard-drives, so some programs could rake as long as 24 hours to run.

I love the process, though. No matter how difficult the problem, I could always solve it. It was like a big puzzle: figure out what part of the program went askew, make changes to that one part and test it repeatedly, and keep doing that until you got it right. Then move on to the next part and repeat until you got it all solved. My classmates were frequently amazed that I would have the projects done weeks in advance. I just loved the process.

Investing doesn't work so easily. The difference is the noisy feedback loop. Orbital mechanics is like clockwork. You know the starting situation, you know the physics, so when something goes off track it is easy to see that it's wrong, and it is easy to figure out where to jump in and fix it.

With investing, the data is much more noisy. By noisy, I mean there are lots of false signals that things are going well when they won't in the long run, and that they are going poorly when they will go well in the long run. 

In other words, when you make a change to your investing process, it can take years, perhaps even decades to see if you really have it right. That's not the happy feedback loop of computer programming with instant and clear feedback.

But, that is the nature of the beast. When you see your results aren't doing what you expect, you need to make changes to adapt, and then wait another couple of years to see how that worked.

The process is the same as it is with computer programming, but the signal is very noisy, meaning you don't know if things have actually gone wrong or not, and the feedback loop takes years instead of minutes to complete. 

I have to admit, I still love to solve the puzzle. Just like with computer programming, I'm as committed and convinced that I can get it right.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

The Lessons Of Oil

Not many outside the investing business have heard of Howard Marks. He is a very successful money manager at Oaktree Capital with a reputation built mostly around distressed debt investing.  

He also writes very well and publishes Memos that I eagerly read.

His latest is on the fall in the price of oil and what lessons we can learn from it.

I highly recommend it to anyone who wants clear thinking on the subject.

If you don't want to read it, here are some quick highlights:

"...what 'everyone knows' is usually unhelpful at best and wrong at worst."

"Not only did the investing herd have the outlook for rates all wrong, but was uniformly inquiring about the wrong thing."

"Asset prices are often set to allow for the risks people are aware of.  It's the ones they haven't thought of that can knock the market for a loop."

"Forecasters usually stick too close to the current level, and on those rare occasions when they call for change, they often underestimate the potential magnitude."

 "This is an example of how hard it can be to appropriately factor all of the relevant considerations into complex real-world analysis."

"Most people easily grasp the immediate impact of developments, but few understand the 'second-order' consequences...as well as the third and fourth."

"...it's hard for most people to understand the self-correcting aspects of economic events."

"If you think markets are logical and investors are objective and unemotional, you're in for a lot of surprises."

"A well-known quote from economist Rudiger Dornbusch goes as follows: 'In economics things take longer to happen than you think they will, and then they happen faster than you thought they could.'"

"The key lesson here may be that cartels and other anti-market mechanisms can't hold forever."

"...it's hard to analytically put a price on an asset that doesn't produce income." 

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

There's no substitute for hard work

When it comes to improving at anything, there is just no substitute for good, old fashioned hard work.

I've been reminded of this lately as I build out my circles of competence through intensive research.

When I started out investing in 1996, I was still working full-time as a pilot in the Air Force and getting my MBA in night school. My research then was heavily focused on quantitative analysis, and my understanding of the qualitative side of investing was slim to none.

As I gained more experience, I also did a lot more research into the qualitative side of research starting in 1998. At that point, my investing results were about as good as the market's, which isn't outstanding, but is quite an accomplishment as a value investor at the end of one of the biggest bull markets in history.

As the dot-com bubble peaked and then exploded from 1999 to 2000, I found myself holding several very under-valued, small brick and mortar companies. Those companies' out-performance was just incredible over the following years.

That was around the time I got out of the Air Force in late 2001 and started as an investing professional.  At that point, I had a lot more time to do qualitative research, but my quantitative method was still working so well that I wasn't quite doing the best research I could. Because the quantitative method looked so easy at the time, I didn't see any good reason to dramatically change.  If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

I found myself beating the market by over 8% annualized from 1995-2002 (71% more, cumulatively, than market returns) and 1995-2003 (85% more, cumulatively, than market returns). It was like shooting fish in a barrel. Because I was having a harder time finding my quantitative darlings in 2004, I was sitting in a lot of cash, but my returns were still beating the market by over 6.5% annualized over 9 years (76% more, cumulatively, than market returns).

What I didn't realize at the time was that value investing was having it's best run ever from 2000-2005. The quantitative method that had served me so well was about to sunset.

That was when I started my own value investing shop. Bad timing.

I knew the quantitative side wasn't working like it had, but I didn't fully grasp why. As time went by, I worked harder and harder to master the qualitative side of investing, but I wasn't quite getting there because I was trying to do it without really working with as much focus as I needed to.

After beating the market by a small margin from 2005 to 2008, I started to realize I needed a more fundamental make-over of my investment research. Instead of quantitative screens, I needed to figure out which companies I wanted to own, qualitatively, and then figure out what they were worth.

I have been on that path ever since, and I've been working longer and longer hours at it. Getting to know one company, and all its competitors, all the other companies in the industry, and the company's suppliers and buyers, the substitute products that may kill the business, and so on takes many hours of reading, re-reading, learning, researching, analyzing, etc.

When it comes time to improve, nothing really beats hard work. Hard work isn't fun, per se, but it does produce great value. I'm ashamed to say that it took me so long to find and pursue this path, but now that I'm on it, I'm not sure why I thought any other method would work.  

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Life lessons from a very successful hedge fund manager

Jonathan Tepper is a very successful hedge fund manager. When I saw him in a TV interview, I envied his intellectual honesty and self-confidence. His track record is outstanding.

John Mauldin recently posted a article by Tepper on life lessons he wanted to give to his nephews (during an airplane ride with heavy turbulence). It's great big-picture thinking, and a great way to start the new year. Happy reading.

Letter to My Nephews

By Jonathan Tepper
December 29, 2014

You can learn a lot from books, but many things can only be learned the hard way by living, suffering and enjoying life.

A year and a half ago, I was in a plane with very bad turbulence, and I worried that if the plane went down, many of the lessons I’ve learned in life would end up at the bottom of the ocean.  I wrote a letter to my nephews for them to read when they were older.  I hope they’ll find it useful.

—————–

Dear nephews,

I’m writing this on a plane. The reason I started writing this was that I feared the plane might go down, and if it went down, all the lessons I’ve learned in life would disappear with me. By writing this, I hope to pass on the few lessons I’ve learned.

The most important lesson is that the vast majority of things you worry about will not bother you the next day. A year later you will not even be able to remember them if you try. When you grow older, you will not worry about what grades you got. You won’t worry about games you lost.   You won’t worry about what other people thought about you. Most of the things you worry about will never happen. Even if the worst things that you worry about happen, life will still go on. Learn to enjoy every day, and try to enjoy it as if it is your last. It has taken me a long time to understand this, and I wish I had understood it sooner.

Happiness is not a destination but a journey. You will never be smart enough, rich enough, have a pretty enough girlfriend, boyfriend, husband or wife, or win enough prizes and awards. Whatever it is you want, there is always something better. Enjoy the journey of learning, working, and living. If you enjoy the journey, you’ll probably achieve a lot more than if you focused on goals.

Money can provide security, but once you have security, more money cannot buy you more happiness. If you show me someone who thinks money can buy happiness, I’ll show you someone who has never had a lot of money.

Things don’t make you happy, but memories will always stay with you. Whatever it is that you buy, you will soon get used to it. It will make you happy for a short while, but it will not make you happy forever. Experiences and memories can make you happy forever. I can’t even remember most of the toys I’ve had in my life, but I still think of my times with Timothy and your Grandmom with great happiness and fondness. I remember walking Timothy to school and how happy we were. I remember hugging your Gradmom when I came home for a weekend. Those memories will never go away. The happiest memories of my friends are my travels and dinners with them, not the things I’ve bought for myself. You’ll remember dinners and travels with friends and family more than any shiny things you’ll ever have.

Your family is the most important thing you have in life. Friends, boyfriends, girlfriends and co-workers come and go, but the only thing that you can always count on is your family. (If you find a friend who is always there for you, you’re extremely lucky. They exist, but they’re very rare.) One day, you will have your own family. You must love them and look after them. You will understand one day that just as your grandparents die, your parents will as well. Strive to be a good son and daughter. One day, you will be like your parents. Your parents are not perfect, and you will not be either. But you can be loving and be a good son and daughter. One day you can be a good parent.

Never stop learning, and always be ready to teach yourself things you don’t know. The only things you will remember are things you care about. You will forget about all the rest. You must teach yourself and care about what you learn. No one can teach you everything you need to know at school or university. You will also forget most of what you study, and that is fine. As Jacques Barzun said, “Civilization is all that remains after you have forgot all that you specifically set out to remember.”

Never live someone else’s life. Find your gifts and the things that give you pleasure, develop those gifts, and pursue them.   Do what makes you happy and be great at it. You have skills and gifts that no one will ever have or see again. If you’re a businessman, build businesses. If you’re a writer, write. If you’re a scientist, discover. If you do what you love and love what you do, you will work very hard, but you will enjoy every day.

One of the things that most influenced me was something Steve Jobs once said:

When you grow up, you tend to get told that the world is the way it is and your life is just to live your life inside the world, try not to bash into the walls too much, try to have a nice family life, have fun, save a little money.

That’s a very limited life. Life can be much broader once you discover one simple fact, and that is that everything around you that you call life was made up by people that were no smarter than you. And you can change it, you can influence it, you can build your own things that other people can use. Once you learn that, you’ll never be the same again.

And the minute that you understand that you can poke life and actually something will, you know if you push in, something will pop out the other side, that you can change it, you can mold it. That’s maybe the most important thing. It’s to shake off this erroneous notion that life is there and you’re just going live in it, versus embrace it, change it, improve it, make your mark upon it.

I think that’s very important and however you learn that, once you learn it, you’ll want 

to change life and make it better, cause it’s kind of messed up, in a lot of ways. Once you learn that, you’ll never be the same again.

I hope that you will find what you love and you will change the world.

Life is full of struggle, and many bad things will happen to you. This is one thing that I can guarantee you. Most of my friends died of AIDS, and your uncle Timothy died in a car accident and your Grandmother committed suicide after suffering from a very bad brain tumor. These things happened and cannot be changed. Many people suffer great tragedies and live full and happy lives. Remember the people you love and mourn them. Accept that terrible things happen, and try to live as if each day is your last with those you love. There is nothing else you can do.

The best way to avoid anxiety, stress and unhappiness is to avoid internal contradiction. Don’t think that one thing is right and do the opposite. Listen to your conscience and obey it. Be a good person and live according to your convictions. You cannot answer for other people, but you can always answer for yourself. As long as you live according to your most basic beliefs, you will not have regrets or guilt. You will be able to die happily knowing that you looked after the poor and needy, that you were loving to those around you, and that you failed often but did your best. You will not lose a night of sleep if you always try to do your best.

I love you very much.

Much love,

Uncle Jonathan

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

The joy of not checking stock prices

I recently finished a wonderful book by Guy Spier, The Education of a Value Investor. In it, he spells out his own history as a value investor and highlights some of the ways he has set up his investing environment to make success more likely.

One of his best suggestions is to check stock prices as infrequently as possible.

This may sound like sacrilege to both professional and layman investors. "How can you react to the market's ebbs and flows if you aren't watching prices all the time?"

The answer is: you shouldn't be reacting to the ebb and flow of prices. A focus on prices going up and down is a distraction to understanding businesses at a fundamental level. Only after you understand a business thoroughly--it's competition, buyers, suppliers, management, potential rivals, possible substitutes--and have figured out what you think a business is worth should you look at the price.

I must admit, I have fallen into the trap of looking at stock prices too frequently. Doing so is very distracting. Instead of focusing on understanding a business and its value, you get dragged into looking at the stock price and begin to impart interpretations into why the price has gone down or up. Every moment spent trying to understand those senseless moves are moments not spent understanding the business.

I have gone the last two weeks without checking stock prices. That doesn't mean I don't have mechanisms set up to react to low or high prices on businesses I already understand, it just means I don't look at daily price moves and how they compare to the market that day. The result is that I've gotten more fundamental research done and I feel more sober-minded in trying to understand the businesses I'm researching.

In time, I believe I'll also have better investment returns to show for it.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Plunging oil prices

The recent plunge in oil prices raises lots of questions.

If you haven't noticed, the U.S. and world price for oil per barrel have plunged 35.2% and 38.2%, respectively, since June. If stock or bond markets were down by this amount, people would be freaking out.

Of course, plunging oil prices sounds like a good thing, right? That means lower costs for fuel at the pump, lower transportation costs with airlines, lower costs to ship goods by rail or truck, lower prices generally, etc.

But, a question should be raised in your mind: why are oil prices plunging? Trying to answer that question is what has many market observers scratching their heads.

Are oil price plunging because demand is dramatically lower? Oil prices frequently plunge going into recessions as demand dries up relative to supply that remains stable. China is certainly slowing down, and large economies like Europe and Brazil are clearly struggling. Slowing growth is, without doubt, part of the issue. Demand has also declined because high oil prices over the last decade have led to reduced consumption and greater use of alternative sources of energy, like solar and wind. That, too, may be playing a part.

Are oil prices plunging because supply is outstripping demand? Shale oil in the U.S. (predominantly) is bringing huge new supplies of oil into the market. High oil prices over the last decade have made it very profitable to find and produce oil. This has made once unprofitable oil in places like the Canadian oil sands and deep sea drilling profitable. Additional supply is definitely playing a part in oil's recent plunge.

But, why has the plunge occurred over the last 5 1/2 months and not before. Declining demand from China, Europe and Brazil did not become hot news over the last 6 months, nor did the increasing supply coming from shale oil, oil sands or deep sea drilling. What, then, has changed?

And this brings us to geopolitics. The price of oil is not set in a truly free market. The OPEC cartel has long been the marginal producer of oil, and Saudi Arabia in particular can usually produce oil to set prices where they want. For the last decade or so, Saudi Arabia and OPEC have been happy with oil prices of around $90 a barrel, and they have been quite open in stating that fact.

Recently, however, the Saudis have said they think oil could stabilize at $60 a barrel. Now, we have the real culprit. Why do the Saudis want oil prices to be 33% lower than previously? And, here comes the speculative part of my article. 

Some observers think that the Saudis have all of a sudden decided to make shale oil and other high cost competition unprofitable. This explanation scores high on the international conspiracy front, but would seem strange given the fact that such high cost competition has been quite obvious for some time. Perhaps it took that long for consensus to build within Saudi Arabia?

Other observers have noted that Russia's move into the Ukraine might be the cause. In this interpretation, the Saudis are doing the west's bidding by increasing supply to put the screws to Russia. It has been said that Russia needs $110 a barrel oil to pay for all its government programs. With that, such an interpretation makes sense although it strains credulity to think that Saudi Arabia would do the west's bidding, especially considering that it is also said that Saudi Arabia needs $90 a barrel oil to fund its own government programs. Also, the crisis in the Ukraine and Crimea with Russia started right after the Sochi Olympics ended--last February. Why would the Saudis wait four months to put Russia under pressure. Consensus building and political wrangling from the west?

Something that did happen last summer as opposed to over the last decade or last February is the rise of the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In fact, in late June, ISIL proclaimed a worldwide caliphate. Around the same time, ISIL took Mosul and threatened to march on Baghdad. The Saudi government lives in fear of an uprising close to or inside their borders because they are themselves a religious totalitarian state. Perhaps the Saudi fear of ISIL or organizations similar to ISIL is what is leading the Saudis to suddenly be comfortable with $60 per barrel oil. Keep in mind that ISIL is funding its uprising with oil it is grabbing and selling on the black market. Making that oil less profitable or unprofitable would clearly put the screws to ISIL and similar followers.

What has caused oil prices to plunge over the last 5 1/2 months? It's probably a combination of the things I raised above: lower demand, higher supply and geopolitics (shale oil boom competition with OPEC, Russia, ISIL). The question now becomes: what happens going forward? How long will the Saudis keep oil prices low? Will that dampen supply and lead to a price spike when the Saudis do let up? How will the rest of the economy or world governments react to lower oil prices? How will that impact the economy as things eventually return to normal?

I don't have answers to those questions, but they will definitely impact world markets and economies over the next several months and years.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

How to make a fortune

The Forbes 400 list of richest Americans came out recently (you can see it here).

I enjoy looking through the list each year (and have for 20) to better understand how people become wealthy. We are not talking about the mass affluent, the affluent, high net worth, or even ultra high net worth, here. We are talking about billionaires. The highest on the list is at $81 billion and the lowest is at $1.55 billion. These people haven't just become wealthy, they have become fabulously so. How?

That's the question I ask myself each year, and this year I decided to keep track.

I wasn't interested in finding out how many inherited wealth. Inheritance does not create wealth. With this in mind, I kept track of how the Forbes 400 made their fortunes.

One category is entrepreneurship. These are people who come up with an idea and then put it to work by starting their own company. The Forbes 400 is dominated by these folks at 52% of the list. Some did it through technology, others through retail, some with restaurants, some with medical devices and pharmaceutical products. These people create the new products and services we all enjoy. They had to be smart and hard working to succeed, but also had some good luck. Think Bill Gates, Larry Ellison, Sam Walton, Michael Bloomberg, Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Not only do the dominate the list as a whole, they dominate the highest rungs of the list.

Next are the business fortunes, clocking in at 20%. These are people who instead of starting companies, either worked at businesses or bought businesses from others and put themselves in charge. Looking over the list, I see that they frequently fix broken businesses or make okay businesses great. Think Steve Ballmer at Microsoft, the Koch brothers, Rupert Murdoch, Richard Kinder, George Kaiser and Meg Whitman.

Next are the investing fortunes, coming in at 19%. These are people who don't start or run businesses, per se, but invest others and their own in such businesses. They may influence the businesses, but they don't run them. In some cases, they are completely separate from the business. This can be done through a holding company, with a hedge fund, through private equity, or running money through mutual funds. Think Warren Buffett, Carl Icahn, George Soros, Len Blavatnik, Ray Dalio, Ron Perelman, John Paulson and James Simons. 

Next are the real estate fortunes, coming in at 9%. These fortunes were built by buying real estate--usually with leverage--and rolling the dollars made back into more real estate. These fortunes are high risk/high reward because of the leverage usually required, but also require smart business moves and an understanding of where and how real estate will succeed. Many Americans, I think, over-estimate how successful this strategy is. The list includes names like Donald Bren, Andrew Beal, Stephen Ross, Richard LeFrakand and Leonard Stern.

I was surprised to see there is a lawyer on the list: 1. So, being a lawyer comes in at 0.3%. Way to go Joe Jamail: The King of Torts.

There you have it. Entrepreneurs top the list. You can make a massive fortune by finding an unmet market need and meeting it through hard work, long hours, and a good piece of luck. Or, you can be a successful businessperson joining the right company at the right time or by fixing broken or sub-par businesses. Or, you can invest other people's money through lots of research and a knack for understanding when markets become irrational. Or, you buy and sell real estate with a lot of debt, some good luck, and a keen sense of location, location, location.

Or, you can be the King of Torts.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

John Deere: expected returns and potential downside

(Full disclosure: my clients and I own shares of Deere.)

In preceding articles, I've covered Deere's (DE) general situation, competition, economics, management, and opportunities & risks. Now it's time to put those thoughts together with some math to figure out what kind of returns can be expected from John Deere.

Before I jump in, I want to make it clear that my expected return discussion is based on the long run. For that reason, it is important to read the full article and see the second half, where I talk about how bad valuation can get in between now and the long run. Caveat emptor.

Long term expected return

My approach to projecting long term returns is to look at long term trends and normalize that for cyclical factors. I want to know what long term, normalized sales per share, net margins, growth and multiples are so that I can estimate a five year price (not necessarily as a five year price target, but a normalized level for price in five years).

Sales per share

In Deere's case, sales growth from 1982 to 2013 (using the exponential fit function in Excel) is quite stable (96.7% R-squared function, Excel). If it weren't, I wouldn't use it. Deviating from this fit would have to assume a secular change in the farming or farm equipment market different from anything seen from 1982 to 2013. A fit from 1982 to 2013 shows a $33.8 billion normalized sales level a year from now. Applying 377 fully diluted shares (I take basic shares and add all options, restricted stock, etc. to that number) to that sales level implies around $90 in sales per share. 

To adjust for the ethanol boom, I also did a fit from 1982-2004, and that showed sales per share of $75. To estimate what things would look like if the last 10 years were the trend going forward, I also did a fit from 2004-2013, and that showed sales per share of $95. Now, I have estimates for normalized sales per share with low, average and high trends in mind.

Net margin

Net margins at Deere have moved a round a lot over the last 32 years. The median net margin over that time was 5.9%, but it has also been steadily trending up (due both to Deere being better managed and a nice tailwind from farming growth scaling up). Below are the the longer to shorter term median net margins:

• 30 year: 6.1%
• 25 year: 7.2%
• 20 year: 7.7%
• 10 year: 7.7%
• 5 year: 8.2%
• 3 year: 9.2%

With these numbers in mind, I'll base my estimates on a low end net margin of 6%, mid point of 7.5%, and high end of 9%.

Growth

I break growth into three parts: sales growth, margin growth, and share growth/buybacks. For Deere, the historic growth trend has been 7.5% (the first fit referred to above). Looking at the trend from 1982-2004 (pre ethanol boom), the trend was 6.7%. These numbers were confirmed by looking at long term averages as well, which show and average of 7.6% and a median of 9.8%. For my estimation, I will use a low end sales growth estimate of 5%, a mid point of 6.5%, and a high end of 8% (I'm being conservative on this because I know the ethanol boom of the last 9 years won't be repeated).

Margin growth has varied widely over the last 32 years, but has generally trended up at a median rate of 1.6%. I think it would be imprudent to assume that Deere can recreate that accomplishment in the coming 5 years, so I will use a low end of 0% margin growth, a mid point of 0.5%, and a high end of 1% (I'm still assuming management can bring margins up with scale, manufacturing efficiencies, etc.).

Share count has also varied a lot over the last 32 years. In the more distant past, share count actually grew, but as management has refocused on building shareholder wealth, and been incentivized to do so, share count has declined at a median rate of 2.3% over the last 18 years and 3.9% over the last 10 years. I don't expect that high rate to continue assuming the agriculture market cools off, but I do expect a low end of 0% buybacks, a mid point of 0.5%, and a high end of 1%.

Putting together these pieces, I'm estimating 5% (5+0+0), 7.5% (6.5+0.5+.05) and 10% (8+1+1) growth rates at the low, mid and high ends.

Multiple

What multiple of earnings has the market been willing to pay for Deere? That has fluctuated widely, too. Because Deere is a cyclical business, investors have been willing to pay high multiples when earnings were low and low multiples when earnings were high. Multiples have also trended up over time as Deere has become a better business with wider profit margins. Given that, the median, low and high multiple to earnings over the last 32 years has been 10.5x and 16.5x, with 13.5x in the middle, so that is what I will use.

Expected returns

If you put together all the low, medium and high end assumptions above over a five year period, plus dividends growing at the same rate as sales per share and an $85 price tag on Deere, you get return expectations (annualized) of -2.9% 11.2% and 23.2%. Now, I assign a range of probabilities to those returns to come up with expected returns. Assuming a probability of 45% and 20% for the low end, 50% to 65% for the mid range, and 5% to 15% for the high end, I come up with a return expectation of 5.5% to 10.2%. (If you plug different numbers into the framework above, you can come up with vastly different results, so a lot depends on your assumptions being valid, or at least reasonable.)

This may not be the barn-burning return you expected, but it looks good compared to my projection of a 3.4% annualized return from the S&P 500 (at $1,982.30) over the next give years.

Keep in mind that my 5-10% return expectation on Deere is a long term projection. The path to that return may be bumpy, as I highlight below in my section on how bad things can get.

How low can you go?

To buy a cyclical company like Deere, it's not enough to have an idea what average future returns may be. You must also be ready to ride the cycle down to an uncomfortably low point, and be willing to buy more on that difficult trip down. This is particularly important with Deere because a long agricultural boom is coming to an end and farm equipment sales are clearly already tumbling. So, how bad can things get for Deere's stock price in between now and the long term?

One way to look at how low Deere's stock price can go is to look at multi-year sales per share (I use sales per share to account for the fact that earnings per share can get so low as to make earnings multiples meaningless) compared to the lowest multiples that have been experienced historically. Looking at an average of 3 year of sales per share relative to lowest annual prices, I can see that Deere got down to a 0.2x multiple of sales per share in 1986. Looking at 5 year average sales per share, 7 year, and 10 year, I see multiples of 0.4x, 0.5x and 0.5x. Below are the prices that Deere could get to, accordingly, from around $85 today:

• 3 year sales per share, 0.2x multiple: $17
• 5 year sales per share, 0.4x multiple: $29
• 7 year sales per share, 0.5x multiple: $33
• 10 year sales per share: 0.5x multiple: $29

I'm not predicting such low prices, but I am saying that Deere could get that low if history is a guide and an equivalently bad downturn occurs.  As I said above, caveat emptor. It should be noted, though, that I don't think the 1986 scenario is likely because this farm boom did not include the debt binge of that period (Kansas City Fed study), but it is best to consider all empirical evidence.

Another way to think about how low Deere's price can get is to look at prior peak to trough sales declines and apply low end multiples. Between 1982 and 1986, Deere's declined peak to trough by 24%. From 1990-1992, 16%; from 1998-1999, 19%; from 2008-2009, 21%. The 1982-1986 scenario, the worst I have on record, would see Deere's 7/31/13 LTM peak sales go from $35,250 to $26,920, or to $71 per share. The 1990 drop, the least bad drop, would pull sales down to $29,573 or $79 per share. Applying the 25th-percentile low multiple (0.5x in both cases) to those figures gives share prices of $35.50 and $39.50. 

A final way to prepare for low prices is to look at my normalized sales fits above and compare them to the lowest multiples of sales seen historically. The trough multiples on normalized sales were 0.2x sales per share in 1986, 0.4x in 1992, 0.6x in 1999, and 0.4x in 2009. Applying those multiples to the fitted sales per share above of $75, $90 and $95 gives price bottoms of $15-19, $30-38 and $45-47.  (Once again, keep in mind I consider the 1986 scenario quite unlikely.)

As I hope I've made clear, although I expect Deere to provide good long term returns, the path to those returns may be quite uncomfortable. Such is the nature of cyclical companies.

The upside is that Deere's price getting that low would likely generate truly amazing returns going forward (as they did for smart investors who bought in 1986, 1992, 1998 and 2009). Prices may never get that low, but it is best to prepare for such an eventuality even if it never occurs. Forewarned is forearmed.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

John Deere's opportunities and risks

(Full disclosure: my clients and I own shares of Deere (DE))

John Deere faces significant opportunities and risks that must be considered before a proper valuation can be done.

Opportunities

The biggest opportunity John Deere faces is booming growth for food in developing and emerging markets. This subject has been covered significantly by others, but I'd like to put a couple of data points out there for consideration. Middle class growth over the next 15 years from places like China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nigeria, etc. will be staggering. That middle class is expected to go from 29% of world population in 2008 to 50% by 2030 (Goldman Sachs, 2008). That larger middle class will lead to higher crop production over time and the need for higher efficiency farm equipment like Deere produces. Higher incomes will also lead to higher protein consumption in the form of meat like beef, pork, chicken, fish, etc. (as it has for every country that has achieved middle class income). It takes 2-6 times the pounds of crops to produce an equal pound of meat (Wikipedia, feed conversion ratio). The shift in middle class diets towards more meat consumption will also lead to the need for higher and more efficient crop production the world over.

A second opportunity for Deere is to boost the lower productivity of many farmers in the world. In corn production, Canada is the second most efficient producer to the U.S. at 96% and Nigeria is only 18% as efficient (looking at production relative to acres harvested, USDA data on Deere's website). With soybeans, Brazil is the most efficient producer, 3% more efficient than the U.S., with Canada at 98% U.S. efficiency and India at 33%. With wheat, the E.U., China, Canada and Ukraine are more efficient than the U.S., but Kazakhstan is only 34% as efficient. The rest of the world can benefit from Deere's high efficiency farming equipment in order to produce the growing demand for more food.

Although Deere dominates in manufacturing large tractors and combines for row crop production, they also have the opportunity to grow share and efficiency in building equipment for other crops, such as cotton, sugarcane, rice, etc. It may take time to build such expertise, but the returns for such effort, especially over the rest of the world, are great.

John Deere isn't just a farm equipment manufacturer, they also make construction and forestry equipment. That division has been in a major slump as both the U.S. and the rest of the world has cut back dramatically on construction and forestry markets. But, the good news for Deere is that such markets are coming back and will come back to a normalized level over time. This recovery will, no doubt, come in fits and starts, but Deere has the opportunity to profit from significantly higher revenues and profit margins as those markets recover. 

A more defensive opportunity for Deere comes from its finance arm. Although this business is likely to decline over time (see risks below), it will decline more slowly than new equipment sales, and that will dampen earnings volatility over the full cycle.

Finally, Deere's businesses have a significant service parts business. Although this is a smaller part of Deere's business, it is profitable and much more stable than selling original equipment.

Risks

An understanding of Deere's opportunities must be balanced against a solid understanding of its risks. Most of these risks relate to the long cyclical boom of farming over the last 5-10 years.

The ethanol production boom has led to great mal-investment over the last 5-10 years. By mal-investment, I'm referring to the Austrian economics term for investment that results from government manipulation of markets. Much more corn has been planted and harvested in order to meet government demands for ethanol production. That artificial demand has led more farmers to buy more equipment than they otherwise would have. Although Deere has benefited from that over the last 5-10 years (and you can see it in their volumes, margins and returns on capital over that time), they have also necessarily overbuilt production capabilities and pulled demand from the future. The boozy boom of the last decade is likely to turn into a nasty hangover over the next decade.

This long boom will take years to work out and for Deere to re-achieve economic equilibrium and then restore normalized growth. That means production will likely need to be cut significantly with a resultant decline in volumes, margins and returns on capital.

The long boom has also resulted in one of the youngest, most productive tractor and combine fleets in history. Farmers making less money (due to lower crop prices caused by supply getting ahead of underlying demand) will be reluctant to replace or even repair such young equipment. This will create the same headwind referred to in the two paragraphs above.

The farm equipment market depends heavily on government financing, especially in places like Brazil. Another risk to Deere is that such funding dries up as many emerging, developing and developed market governments try to right their own fiscal problems. This could create an additional headwind to production volumes and profitability.

John Deere also specializes in large, hyper-efficient farm equipment that most of the developing world is not as willing or ready to purchase. It will take Deere time to build up profitability of smaller tractors and harvesters and and adapt them to new local markets. Added to this, Deere doesn't possess the same advantages in smaller scale farm equipment that they possess in large equipment, thus under-cutting one of their key competitive advantages. 

Although Deere's finance arm dampens earnings volatility over the full cycle, it will also become a headwind over time as less new equipment is financed (thus shrinking the earning portfolio) and less profitable farmers default on their financing. Added to this, such problems will generate more used equipment to compete with Deere's new equipment. Financing equipment sales is a double-edged sword that will be considered an increasing risk over time (until, that is, market equilibrium is restored).

Reviewing the opportunities above, you can see there are mostly secular growth opportunities offsetting cyclical decline risks. How these two forces play against each other is another risk for Deere. Will secular growth overcome the downturn due to mal-investment and a return to normalized economics? Or will it take time for secular growth to overcome the cyclical headwinds of over-production? I don't know the answer, but I know it is a risk for Deere as an investment. I would expect the cyclical headwind to prevail over the short to intermediate term and for the secular tailwind to assert itself over the intermediate to long term.

Next week, I will take a hack at Deere's valuation, keeping in mind the risk and opportunities highlighted above.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

John Deere: Management

(Full disclosure: my clients and I own shares of Deere)

After covering John Deere's (DE) general situation, competitive position, and economics, I will now take a hard look at management. Specifically, I want to examine the board of directors, executive team, and then evaluate both.

Board of Directors

Deere's board consists of 11 members, which I think it too big. It consists of the CEO/chairman, an insider, 5 major executives (from Lockheed Martin, DuPont, Rockwell Collins, BMW, Cargill), 2 minor executives (Springs Company, New Vernon Capital), one professor, and one former general.

I like to see representation by executives who have real experience allocating capital, managing people and making hard decisions. Many of Deere's board members serve on several other boards, though, so I wonder how focused they are on Deere. Professors are very intelligent people with unique knowledge, but that doesn't qualify them to judge a business, capital allocation, or senior executives (any more than being an investor qualifies me to write treatises on economics). The same can be said for a retired general (as an ex-Air Force officer, that's not blind prejudice). 

The average pay for the board of directors (not including chair/CEO) is $230,000 per year. That is not a large sum given the size and prominence of Deere. 

Directors own anywhere from $299,000 in Deere shares to $2.66 million. 7 members own more share value than 3 years worth of board salary, which I think makes them act more like owners. The other four own 1-3 times board salary, which makes them more inclined to vote their salary than their ownership. Unfortunately, board ownership is almost exclusively from restricted stock awards. In other words, the board hasn't invested their own hard-earned money in Deere like investors.

Deere's board resembles most large company boards, with lots of prominent members--some with business experience, some not--handsomely paid and with little ownership. I'd prefer members who've put their own dollars on the line like investors, and perhaps a couple of directors who are from the asset management world (private equity, money management, etc.). Instead, Deere's board is filled with executives who are likely to feel sympathy with Deere's management where I'd prefer some people willing to hold management accountable to tough standards.

Executive Team

The top five members of Deere's executive team average 28 years at Deere. The CEO has been there 39 years and the CFO is the newbie at 18. I prefer management teams that are brought up in the business, especially a cyclical business like Deere's. Each manager has a breadth of experience at different divisions inside the company and understand well Deere's culture (and could not, perhaps, work as well outside that culture).

Pay at Deere is broken into salary, discretionary bonus, short-term incentives, mid-term incentives, long-term incentives and other. The board employs a compensation consultant, which tends to ratchet up pay because they look at peers who are doing the same peer reviews and, therefore, also ratcheting up their pay. 

Deere's short-term incentive is based on operating return on operating assets for the operating side of the business and return on equity for the finance arm. The operating return metric is adjusted for low, medium and high volume years (which aren't really in management's control). This is a very good incentive program and one of the best I've seen.

The mid-term incentive is based on shareholder value added (operating profit minus cost of capital: 12% for equipment operations and 15% for finance). The metric is judged over rolling 3 year periods. Once again, an impressive incentive system that's fair to shareholders and management.

The long-term incentive consists of performance stock units, restricted stock units, and stock options. The performance stock units are awarded 50% based on revenue growth and 50% on shareholder return relative to the S&P 500 industrial sector. Once again, a very shareholder-friendly reward system.

Other pay is another $153,000 to $520,000 a year, including: personal use of company aircraft, financial planning, relocation, medical exams, perquisites, tax gross ups, and defined contribution plans. That's a bit steep, but not unusual for a company this size.

Deere shows the typical monster payouts that executives would receive upon death, disability, retirement, termination with or without cause, and voluntary separation. It's not my favorite, but what can you do. All the other kids have one, too.

The CEO/chairman averaged $19 million in pay over the last 3 years, and the other 4 executives averaged $4.3 to $4.8 million. Just on a rough comparison with Caterpillar and AGCO in terms of pay relative to revenue and operating profit, Deere falls in between the two, which can be explained simply in terms of company scale (the size of pay relative to the size of sales and profits tends to go down, proportionately as companies get bigger).

Ownership at Deere is not exemplary. The CEO owns $8.1 million in shares (I'm not counting the options they give out as lottery tickets), which is one-half his salary each year. Other executives own similarly paltry amounts with pay anywhere from 1.7 to 12.5 times ownership. This management team's ownership clearly makes them act as hired hands and not owners.

Pay is high, but the incentive to perform along the right dimensions is there. The record of competitive position and economics covered in my last two blog entries is, without doubt, a more important exhibit in judging management.

Evaluation

My overly-detailed analysis above just sets the context for evaluating Deere's managers. What's most important is that management understands the economics of Deere's business and can maintain and expand its competitive advantages over time. Judging by their record over the past 20 years, I'd say they have been doing a good job improving margins, boosting capital efficiency, and making their products the best on the market. They've had a nice tailwind due to ethanol subsidies and global growth, but they've also played that hand well. 

The management team has been at Deere a long time. They have ridden through previous boom and bust cycles and should understand how to ride them out. As Martha Stewart would say, that's a good thing.

I'd prefer to see a board with more owners and proven capital allocators. I'd prefer management owned more shares that they purchased with their own money, too. But, Deere also has a compensation scheme that rewards improvements in operating returns to assets and return on equity, awards bonus pay based on operating profits after a meaningful capital charge, and provides performance shares based on revenue growth and total return to shareholders relative to a relevant benchmark. 

Deere's board and management may not represent perfect alignment with shareholders, but management is experienced and they are compensated for meaningful performance. They've also demonstrated a track record of improving the economics of the business.

Before I get into Deere's valuation, I need to cover the risks and opportunities that Deere is facing. I'll provide that in two weeks.   

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.