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Friday, October 26, 2007

Will the Fed cut rates?

The market certainly seems to think so.

Just look at interest rate futures and you'll see investors are expecting a 25 to 50 basis point cut in the Fed Funds Rate.

Or, more meaningfully, look at the gold market. Gold prices spiked to over $785 an ounce, today.

That's up 17% over the last month and 31% over the last year.

Why does the gold market indicate a cut in the Fed Funds Rate?

Because the Fed does not create growth--they do not possess some magical fairy dust that makes the economy run faster.

The Fed prints money to decrease interest rates. And, when the Fed prints money more quickly than the economy grows, they create inflation.

Gold prices are going up because gold investors believe the Fed will print money, also known as cutting the Fed Funds rate, thus creating inflation.

Gold is going up because investors are guessing the Fed will create inflation by cutting rates.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Monday, October 22, 2007

Comparing apples and oranges

What would you say if I told you the market was over-valued by 30%? Would you think I was full of it?

What if I told you that this over-valuation were based solely on market commentators comparing apples and oranges?

When someone says the market is fairly valued or over-valued, what do they mean by that? What standard are they comparing it to? This may seem like a pie-in-the-sky question, but it's very important.

Why? Because market commentators are frequently saying the market is fairly valued by comparing apples and oranges! And, the two are off by 30%.

You see, many say the S&P 500 is fairly valued because they are comparing the S&P 500's forecast, operating earnings to the S&P 500's actual, reporting earnings. But that's comparing apples and oranges.

This may seem like technical minutia, but it makes a big difference. In fact, operating earnings of the S&P 500 have been 20% higher than reported earnings over the last 5 years. And, forecast earnings for the S&P 500 have been 10% higher than actual earnings.

In other words, when commentators say that the S&P 500 is trading at its historical average, they are comparing apples (forecast, operating earnings) to oranges (actual, reported earnings). And, those apples are 30% overstated compared to the oranges.

Next time you hear someone say the market is fairly valued, ask them if they are comparing apples to oranges. Are they comparing forecast, operating earnings to the historical average of actual, reported earnings? If so, tell them to adjust their numbers and get back to you when their figures are fairly comparing apples to apples.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Friday, October 19, 2007

Did credit market turmoil rattle equity markets...again?!

I watched with fascination as short term government interest rates plunged on Wednesday and Thursday. But, to my surprise, equity markets barely reacted.

Then along came Friday.

I don't think the anniversary of the 1987 stock market crash had a thing to do with it, but I do think interest rates had something to do with it--like they did in 1987.

When I see short term Treasuries surging in price and their yields plunging, that means that someone, somewhere is scared and they are running to the safest securities they can find--US Treasury securities of short duration.

Whenever this happens, like it did in August, it means risk is becoming more expensive. And, when that happens, equities will almost always dive.

Why did it take a couple of days to work out? I don't really know.

Perhaps the same people running to safety were hoping things would cool off, but they didn't. And when risk continued to be more expensive, then they started selling equities.

Perhaps some leveraged investors, like hedge funds, were squeezed by the people who lent them money as credit markets seized up again.

Who knows?

But, I do know you could see it coming, and it didn't surprise me (except that it took so long).

Its amazing to watch this because it shows how integrated financial markets are.

Anyone watching short rates plunge on Wednesday and Thursday had to scratch their head and wonder why equities weren't tanking. That is, until Friday--when they did.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Wednesday, October 17, 2007

My latest client letter is available

For those of you interested, my latest client letter just came out today.

In it, I discuss client account performance, my projections for the market over the next 6 years and my opinion on the economy, Part III of my assembling portfolios segment dealing with investment probabilities, an investment spotlight on Microsoft, a segment on why the subprime mortgage market impacted equity markets, and my section on admirable business people covering Benjamin Graham--the father of value investing.

If you get a chance to read it, please tell me what you think and what could be improved.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Monday, October 15, 2007

Does everyone believe the market will continue to climb from here?

Not John Hussman. Hussman makes his case in his latest Weekly Market Comment.

Although Hussman gets very close to attempting market timing, which I don't believe anyone can do successfully, he does make some very good points about why the market's returns from here may not be very exciting.

Luckily, we don't need to invest in the market per se, and it's possible to get significantly better returns in the right investments.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Wednesday, October 10, 2007

Stick to the fundamentals

Although I tend to write here about the economy and markets in general, I must admit such opinions affect my investment process very little.

I don't buy and sell based on what the market is doing or might do. I don't buy and sell based on my assessment of the overall economy.

I buy when I find businesses selling significantly below assessed value and sell when the businesses I've bought are selling significantly above assessed value.

I pay attention to secular trends, such as energy prices and the expansion of cable into phone and broadband Internet, but I don't use such trends as a starting point in my investment process.

I spend my days researching individual companies. I look for businesses with good economics--with sustainable competitive advantages. I look for businesses with great management, who are competent and rational, act as trustees for shareholders, and hold a significant stake in their company. Then, and only then, do I assess business value.

When the market is tanking or roaring ahead, it's important to keep this in mind.

The best way to succeed in investing is to buy good businesses below their assessed business value and sell only if price exceeds valuation. To do this, you must stick to the fundamentals--you must primarily focus on business economics, management and valuation.

When the market is diving, it may be an opportunity to buy, but only if prices go below assessed value. When the market is rising, it may be an opportunity to sell, but only if prices go above assessed value.

The focus is always on the business fundamentals primarily, and only secondarily on prices. What the market and economy are doing should take a distant, and almost completely unimportant, third.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Monday, October 08, 2007

If the US economy slows, will the world economy slow, too?

Many market watchers believe that even if the US economy slows (as it looks like its doing), the global economy will stay in the growth lane because emerging markets like China, India, Brazil and Russia will more than make up for US slowing.

A look at historical information and the global yield curve seems to contradict this. William Hester, CFA of Hussman Funds wrote a great article addressing this subject.

The global yield curve is a way of looking at the yield offered by government bonds around the world at different maturities. By comparing short to long term bond yields, one accesses one of the most reliable predictors of economic growth.

You see, when short term rates are equal to or higher than long rates, this almost always signals economic slowing and, usually, a recession. When short rates are equal to long rates, that's referred to as a flat yield curve. When short rates are higher than long rates, that's called an inverted yield curve.

Using global bond yields, as Hester does, a flat or inverted yield curve usually precedes a recession by a year or two. As he shows, the global yield curve turned flat last July, perhaps signaling that global earnings growth may slow, too.

Although the yield curve is not a fool-proof method of determining future economic growth, it's been reliable enough that it shouldn't be ignored, either.

Although it looks like the world economy is currently humming right along and will easily weather the US slowdown, the yield curve is telling a different story.

As Hester suggest, this has historically been a bad time to be in industrial, consumer discretionary or energy stocks, and a good time to be in materials and consumer staple stocks.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Thursday, October 04, 2007

The Fed's interest rate cut hurts the prudent

For those who think the Fed's recent interest rate cut is an unmitigated good, read Allan Sloan's recent Fortune article titled, "Heads I Win, Tails I Get Bailed Out; The reckless are getting relief from Bernanke. How does that work?"

I've blogged in the past about the moral hazard implicit in the Fed cutting rates. I believe the Fed's large rate cut encourages imprudent risk taking.

But, I didn't highlight how the rate cut hurts the prudent, and Allan Sloan does a great job of that. As Sloan puts it, the "recent interest rate cut has done a lot of harm to those of us who've managed our finances prudently."

The Fed cut rates to calm market turbulence, and this was directed to helping the "players in the biggest trouble," those "who'd taken the biggest fliers in junk mortgages, ultra-risky leveraged buyouts, and other financial esoterica that proved to be malignant."

But, this rate cut not only helped the imprudent, it hurt the prudent. It hurt "those of us who keep score in dollars and didn't need to be bailed out" because we are now "less wealthy than we were in terms of anything other than our home currency."

Why? Because the rate cut "contributed heavily to the dollar's recent sharp drop in the currency markets...and to the price spike in hard assets like gold, silver, copper, and oil." In other words, prudent people's wealth, in terms of dollars, is worth less relative to the things we want to buy with dollars.

Added to this, the rate cut caused long term and fixed mortgage rates up. Once again, this benefits the imprudent who gambled on floating rate loans and punishes the prudent who may be seeking fixed rate loans at what are now higher rates.

Those investors who stayed away from toxic waste and invested prudently are also being punished because the Fed's bailout is helping toxic waste investors to the relative detriment of those who avoided subprime mortgage risks of all sorts (whether bonds, CDO's, stocks, swaps, etc.).

Finally, the prudent get to bail out the imprudent in that our tax dollars will be used to bail out subprime borrowers, subprime lenders (like Countrywide), subprime investors, and the investment banks and rating agencies who should have known that subprime investments were junk.

As Sloan puts it, the Fed's bailout allows the imprudent to play "heads I win, tails I get bailed out" whereas prudent investors get stuck with depreciated wealth, higher fixed rate loans, worse relative investment performance, and a higher tax burden.

If you've been imprudent over the last several years, you probably think the Fed's rate cut is wonderful. But, for those of us who were prudent enough to avoid bad risks, the Fed's rate cut is bad news.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Wednesday, October 03, 2007

Thank you Wall Street Journal for calling the bottom on Wal-Mart

Let me say at the get-go that both I and my clients own shares in Wal-Mart, so I'm anything but unbiased on this subject.

I've blogged in the past about how frequently the popular press reflects popular sentiment instead of reporting news that can be used to make good investment decisions. Well, here's another example.

Today, a Wall Street Journal article by Gary McWilliams may have called the bottom on Wal-Mart. The article is titled, "Wal-Mart Era Wanes Amid Big Shifts in Retail; Rivals Find Strategies To Defeat Low Prices; World Has Changed."

My point here is not to dispute the article's facts or conclusions, but to highlight that stock prices are a reflection of popular sentiment. By the time "news" hits the front page of the popular press, stock prices almost certainly already reflect that "news." I believe this to be the case here, too.

You see, everyone knows that Wal-Mart same store sales are low.

Everyone knows that Wal-Mart is perceived to treat its workers unfairly.

Everyone knows that competitors like Target, Whole Foods, Kroger, etc. have been growing more quickly than Wal-Mart.

Everyone knows that Wal-Mart's suppliers like Pepsi, Proctor and Gamble, etc. are tired of being squeezed by Wal-Mart's ever-present desire to wring costs out of the system.

Everyone knows that Wal-Mart pulled out of Korea and Germany and is struggling in Japan.

Everyone knows that Wal-Mart's store expansion has cannibalized older store sales.

Everyone knows that Tesco is entering the US market and will probably compete fiercely with Wal-Mart.

I don't think the article reports on a single piece of information that hasn't already been frequently and widely reported in other places.

In other words, the article isn't news, it's simply the reflection of what everybody already knows. And, all of this supposedly bad news had already been priced into the stock.

When articles like this, summarizing what everybody already knows, hits the front page of the popular press, calling for the end of whatever or the ultimate dominance of whatever, it's almost always a sign that things are about to reverse.

And, I believe this to be the case here, too.

The time to sell a company is not when the popular press reports that its era has passed. By then, it's too late. You should probably be buying.

The time to buy a company is not when the popular press reports that it has become completely dominant. By then, it's too late and you should probably be selling.

No, when the popular press decisively concludes that the end of a company's era has arrived, it's almost certainly the time to buy.

And, I'll bet that in a few years I'll be writing a blog saying that I've sold Wal-Mart because the popular press is reporting that Wal-Mart is back at the top of its game again.

Thank you popular press for making the timing of my purchases and sales easier.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Monday, October 01, 2007

Contrary to popular belief, firms that pay return on capital to investors are better investments than those that reinvest capital back into the business

A recent paper by James Montier brilliantly highlighted this issue.

For example, a recent McKinsey paper showed that corporate executives know 17% of their invested capital went toward underperforming investments that should have been terminated and 16% of their investments were a mistake to have financed in the first place.

Many corporate managements do a terrible job of investing corporate capital.

When asked how accurately such executives could forecast corporate investments, 70% of managers said they were too optimistic about the time to complete a project, 50% said they were too optimistic about the impact an investment would have, and 40% were too optimistic about the costs involved.

It's not surprising that management is overly optimistic about their pet projects.

Even worse, 40% of managers admitted that they "hide, restrict, or misrepresent information" when submitting capital investment proposals, and 50% of subordinates working on such capital investment projects said it was important to avoid contradicting superiors.

No wonder most companies are bad capital allocators--managers are rarely honest with themselves about their pet projects, and they discourage dissent when discussing potential results.

In other words, companies that retain capital instead of paying dividends or buying back stock and debt tend to be worse investments than those that tend to pay out return on capital to shareholders. Here's the proof:

A study by Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo showed that low capital expenditure companies outperformed high capital expenditure companies by up to 10% per year.

The companies that returned capital to shareholders beat the companies that pumped capital back into the business.

Another way to look at it was highlighted in a study by Cooper, Gulen and Schill, who showed that companies with low asset growth, in terms of cash, property, plant, equipment, etc. returned as much as 20% per year more than companies with high asset growth.

I think these findings are counter-intuitive to what most investors believe, and certainly to what many professional investors think, too.

It's a rare company that can allocate capital effectively, and the proof is clear that companies, on average, that retain capital for investing aren't necessarily good investments. It's important to realize, too, that not all companies are bad capital allocators.

This is why I pay so much attention to return on incremental capital invested when I research businesses to invest in.

I stay away from any company that rewards management for retaining capital, especially when management has a bad track record of effectively reinvesting those dollars.

But, I love to see a management that wisely returns capital to investors when they don't have opportunities and have great track records for adding value when capital is retained.

Nothing in this blog should be considered investment, financial, tax, or legal advice. The opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are subject to change without notice. Information throughout this blog has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, but such accuracy cannot be guaranteed.